Introduction
In February of 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996, codifying the directive for the Federal Communications Commission to "promote competition" and "reduce regulation." 1 Deregulation is not the strong suit of a regulator, but nonetheless the Commission managed to implement a number of major deregulatory policies throughout the Clinton and Bush years, often with strong bipartisan support.
As the telecommunications industry transitioned from telephone to Internet services, however, new sources of significant profits emerged in the broadband ecosystem.
A struggle over these newfound rents would reignite the desire to employ regulation for special interest purposes. 2 The regulatory battle between the Internet's core-broadband service providers ("BSPs") like AT&T and Comcastand the Internet's edge-the new and powerful players like Google, Amazon, and Netflix-was on.
Edge providers moved quickly and decisively, developing a remarkably (and, as argued by some, inappropriately) close relationship with the Obama Administration. 3 The early signals of this regulatory capture were unmistakable, beginning with the near immediate proposal of heavy-handed Net Neutrality regulation; 4 followed by the determination that broadband was not being deployed on a "reasonable and timely basis" 5 to justify wide-ranging interventions using Section 706 as legal authority; and then moving on the rejection of precedent in refusing to conclude that the U.S. mobile market was "effectively competitive." 6 With this start, the FCC, led by Julius Genachowski and later Tom Wheeler, initiated a deliberate and sustained series of policies specifically designed to shift the ecosystem's profits away from the core and-either directly or indirectly-towards the edge. 7 … over the period 2010-2016, the telecommunications sector lost approximately 100,000 jobs per year-many of them high-paying union jobs. This loss is the payequivalent of about 130,000 "average" U.S. jobs.
For BSPs, the Obama Administration turned out to be an eight-year reign of terror. The breadth of the Obama Administration's attack on BSPs started immediately and ran wide, including, but was in no way limited to: (a) reclassifing broadband Internet access as a common carrier "telecommunications" service under Title II of the Communications Act; 8 (b) imposing an asymmetrical privacy regime on the Internet ecosystem; 9 (c) attempting to force Multichannel Delivered Video Providers to provide third parties access to their programming through settop box regulation; 10 (d) preempting state municipal broadband laws to facilitate government competition against the private sector (a decision later overturned by the courts); 11 (e) requiring mandatory mobile data roaming, thus relieving any incentive for new entrants to build their own facilities; 12 (f) establishing an unsurmountable hurdle for forbearance from unbundling obligations; 13 and (g) attempting to impose a massive rate cut for Business Data Services (formally known as "special access" services) based on flimsy evidence. 14 Empirical evidence shows that the regulatory revival in the telecommunications industry has reduced investment between $20 and $40 billion annually, robbing the nation of a boom in network expansion the public wants and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act mandates.
As firms are not passive recipients of regulation, it should come as no surprise that this "regulatory revival" at the FCC slowed the flow of capital into telecommunications networks. 15 Empirical research reveals sizable declines in broadband network investment after President Obama took office, averaging a stunning $20 to $40 billion a year. While historical trends portended a boom in telecommunications investment after 2010, instead the U.S. saw its communications networks barely tread water in terms of capital spending. 16 The effects of this reduced investment are expected to impact labor markets. Empirical research indicates there is a strong relationship between investment in telecommunications and jobs. 17 If investment rises, then employment is increased; conversely, if investment declines, then employment is reduced.
With the investment effects already quantified, the purpose of this PERSPECTIVE is to examine how this reduced investment affected the labor market. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' ("BLS") data on industry employment, I quantify the effect on telecommunications jobs of the Obama Administration's regulatory revival using the difference-in-differences ("DiD") estimator. I find that over the period 2010-2016, the telecommunications sector lost approximately 100,000 jobs per year-many of them high-paying union jobs. This loss is the pay-equivalent of about 130,000 "average" U.S. jobs.
[T]he FCC, led by Julius Genachowski and later Tom Wheeler, initiated a deliberate and sustained series of policies specifically designed to shift the ecosystem's profits away from the core and-either directly or indirectly-towards the edge.
Quantification of Employment Effect
Employment effects of the regulatory revival at the FCC are quantified using the difference-indifferences ("DiD") regression,
where yit is the (natural log of) the employment level for economic sector i at time t, Dit is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the period for which the broadband providers faced the possibility of reclassification (0 otherwise), i is fixed effect for each economic sector in the sample i, t is a time fixed effect common to all observations in time t, and it is the econometric disturbance term that is assumed to be distributed independently of all  and . 18 Employment data (y) is provided by the BLS. 19 I construct a panel dataset of monthly employment data for multiple sectors of the economy (both major and minor) over the years 2000 through 2016.
My task is to look for employment effects in the treated "Telecommunications" sector, a subset of the "Information" sector. As in prior studies on the reclassification of broadband and the regulatory revival in telecommunications, the treatment date is set at year 2010. 20 For the DiD method, the control group must be selected with the parallel paths assumption in mind. That is, trends for the control group must be very similar to the treated group prior to the treatment. Based on correlation coefficients, visual inspection, and a preference for multiple minor over a single major sector, a control pool of were six units was chosen: Primary Figure 1 shows the pre-treatment employment trends for telecommunications and the control units. All the series are in natural log form and have been smoothed and centered on zero for graphical purposes. 21 The control units follow telecommunications employment closely. Though the parallel paths assumption is untestable, researchers often conduct a test to ensure the pre-treatment growth rates of the control group and the telecommunications employment trend are statistically equal. I conduct such an analysis and find no evidence to indicate that the growth rates are not statistically equal (t-statistic = -1.13), a result which lends some credibility to the suitability of the control group. 22 Given the difficulty measuring the edge of a dark cloud and because modifying business plans takes time, it is reasonable to permit some delay in the realization of employment changes. Consequently, I exclude both years 2010 and 2011 from the sample as treatment years, and also exclude 2012 in an auxiliary regression. There are seven sectors in the sample including telecommunications and the six control sectors. With 180 monthly observations for each sample member, there are a total of 1,260 observations in the full sample. The F-statistic of the model is significant at better than the 1% level and the R 2 is 0.997, so almost all the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model.
Since all but one of the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) is a fixed effect (and of no particular import), the results are easily summarized.
The DiD estimator is -0.105, implying the regulatory revival caused an 10% reduction in telecommunications employment. 23 The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at better than the 1% level (t = -17.13).
The employment effects are very large. Average employment in the telecommunications sector over the treatment period (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) Average wages in the telecommunications sector are nearly 30% above average private sector wages, so the employment effects are even more economically meaningful than the very large reduction in jobs suggests being the equivalent of about 122,000 "average" private sector jobs annually, with a confidence interval of 108,000 to about 137,000 jobs. 24 Excluding years 2010, 2011, and 2012 from the estimation as treatment years (N = 1,176), the estimated DiD coefficient is -0.115 (t = -17.01), with a marginal effect of -10.9%. 25 Annual losses are now 103,190 jobs, with a confidence interval of 90,670 to 115,877. This auxiliary model indicates that job losses during the Obama Administration averaged close to 100,000 jobs per year. Like the investment effects, the employment effects of the regulatory revival are massive.
How one feels about regulating monopolies aside, heavy-handed interventions in workably competitive markets is certainly fraught with peril. The Obama Administration's "reign of terror" on telecommunications providers is a prime example.
Influence of Control Units
In order to assess the possibility of an outsized impact on the DiD estimator of a particular control unit, Table 1 summarizes the regulationinduced job losses by excluding one control unit from the control group using a three-year treatment window. The table shows that the DiD estimator varies from the elimination of a control unit, but not by much. All the DiD estimators indicate large and statisticallysignificant jobs losses in the telecommunications sector. Sig. Levels: * 10%, ** 5% *** 1%
The DiD estimator () is not terribly sensitive to the control group, and job losses are in the range of about 93,000 to 117,000. Plainly, these are all large employment effects, indicating roughly a 10% reduction in sector employment. 
Conclusion
Government involvement in a market economy has its place, such as the defining and enforcing of property rights. Economic research and practical experience casts doubt, however, on the benefits of price regulation, and other efforts to control market activity, even under conditions of monopoly supply. As is often said, the only thing worse than an unregulated monopoly is a regulated one. More bluntly, and perhaps more apropos in this instance, Ayres and Brathwaite observe, "the only thing worse than letting market power coalesce in private hands is giving a corrupt Leviathan the power to define the parameters of market transactions." 28 How one feels about regulating monopolies aside, heavy-handed interventions in workably competitive markets is certainly fraught with peril. The Obama Administration's "reign of terror" on telecommunications providers is a prime example. Empirical evidence shows that the regulatory revival in the telecommunications industry has reduced investment between $20 and $40 billion annually, robbing the nation of a boom in network expansion the public wants and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act mandates. 29 In turn, the reduction in capital spending reduced jobs. In this PERSPECTIVE, I offer empirical evidence showing that the Obama Administration's aggressive regulatory approach reduced employment in the telecommunications sector by about 10% or about 100,000 jobs each year. Services, FOURTEENTH REPORT, 25 FCC Rcd 11407 (2010) (available at: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81A1.pdf). The Commission continued to refuse that the U.S. wireless market was effectively competitive for the duration of the Obama Administration.
NOTES

Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile
See https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/commercial-mobile-radio-services-competition-reports. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, REPORT AND ORDER ON REMAND, DECLARATORY RULING, AND ORDER, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24, 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (rel. Mar. 12, 2015) Since the data is monthly and subject to cyclical variation, a smoothed series was used for some of this preliminary analysis. To create this series, I apply the Hodrick-Prescott Filter to the data. My goal is to smooth out the cyclical variation without introducing spurious trends, so a relatively low smoothing parameter is used considering the data is monthly ( = 2,500).
22
The regression in the pre-treatment period is of the dependent variable on a time trend, an interaction term of the trend with a dummy for the telecommunications sector, and sector fixed effects.
23
The marginal effect is exp() -1.
24
Wage data is available at www.bls.gov/data (comparing private sector wages to the telecommunications sector).
25
Excluding only year 2010 as the treatment window, the DiD estimator indicates an average job of 84,154 jobs (with tstatistic -16.54).
26
A compensated AIC is used to address the difference in sample sizes. The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
